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Abstract: The correct behavior of spacecraft components is the foundation of unhindered mission
operation. However, no technical system is free of wear and degradation. A malfunction of one single
component might significantly alter the behavior of the whole spacecraft and may even lead to a
complete mission failure. Therefore, abnormal component behavior must be detected early in order to
be able to perform counter measures. A dedicated fault detection system can be employed, as opposed
to classical health monitoring, performed by human operators, to decrease the response time to a
malfunction. In this paper, we present a generic model-based diagnosis system, which detects faults
by analyzing the spacecraft’s housekeeping data. The observed behavior of the spacecraft components,
given by the housekeeping data is compared to their expected behavior, obtained through simulation.
Each discrepancy between the observed and the expected behavior of a component generates a
so-called symptom. Given the symptoms, the diagnoses are derived by computing sets of components
whose malfunction might cause the observed discrepancies. We demonstrate the applicability of
the diagnosis system by using modified housekeeping data of the qualification model of an actual
spacecraft and outline the advantages and drawbacks of our approach.
Keywords: fault detection; model-based diagnosis; nano-satellite
1. Introduction
Fault detection during spacecraft missions is classically done by human operators in a manual or
semi-automatic fashion with the use of a telemetry client displaying the spacecraft’s housekeeping
data. When a telemetry parameter violates a predefined threshold limit, the operators get notified
and try to find the cause of the limit violation. The main drawback of this process is that it relies
on malfunctions, be it a component fault or failure, to be directly observable in the telemetry. Many
malfunctions do not suddenly occur with full intensity. Instead, the spacecraft’s components degrade
slowly, which causes initial abnormal behavior to be very subtle and to increase in severity as the
component deteriorates. These subtle changes in a components behavior are initially not observable in
the telemetry data. Manual supervision by human operators is highly susceptible to overlook such
subtle malfunctions, not directly visible while using the telemetry alone. However, the occurrence of a
malfunction in form of a violated limit often indicates that a fault could not be spotted in time and may
have already damaged the associated component.
Dedicated fault detection systems have been developed as a response to the flaws of manual
health monitoring. Such dedicated fault detection systems are often tailored to a specific spacecraft or
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a specific subsystem within a specific spacecraft and especially quantitative systems feature little or
no decoupling of the fault detection algorithm and the structural description of the spacecraft. As a
result, the expansion of the diagnostic capabilities of a special purpose system on board a spacecraft
becomes difficult, as it requires the upload of both the system description of the spacecraft, as well
as the complete fault detection algorithm. This poses an impediment to mission operation, as the
uplink capacity is generally very limited. Software uploads may take up to several weeks. Another
unfavorable aspect is that transferring the fault detection system from one spacecraft to another
requires extensive re-engineering. While most systems are limited to the single fault case, some systems
simultaneously allow for the detection of multiple malfunctions, but are often limited by being based
on qualitative system descriptions, greatly reducing their power of expression and the number of
components that can be modelled.
The Artificial Intelligence (AI) community and the Fault-Detection and Isolation (FDI) community
are both active on the research topic of diagnosis. While fault detection and diagnosis of spacecraft
often relies on hardware and sensor redundancy [1], adding redundant hardware to the spacecraft
is not always possible, due to space, weight, and cost constraints. As a result, redundancy through
software was studied. The FDI community’s classical approach to the problem is the concept of
analytical redundancy [2–4]. Focusing on quantitative model-based methods, parity relations, observers,
Kalman-filter, and parameter estimations are used to derive so-called Analytical Redundancy Relations
(ARRs). If an ARRs residual deviates from zero by more than a certain threshold, a fault is detected.
The residuals of all ARRs form the fault signature. The fault signature can then be used to narrow
down the candidates of malfunctioning components.
Examples of fault detection systems from the field of aerospace based on residual generation
include the work of [5,6], while using both Matlab/Simulink models. The work of [5] deals with faults
that affect the thrusters of the Mars Express spacecraft and [6] deals with the detection of faults on
the wing-flap actuators of the HL-20 reusable launch vehicle. For both systems, the model is tightly
coupled with the fault detection algorithm, making both adaptions to the existing model and transfer
to different air- and spacecraft require extensive re-engineering.
The AI community on the other hand employs expert systems and so-called Model-Based
Diagnosis (MBD), which is of qualitative and symbolic nature [7,8]. Expert system based fault detection
uses the sensor data of the technical system to compute characteristic values, so-called symptoms,
which then are used to derive diagnoses, with the help of a knowledge base. An application that was
based on this principle built to be used in spacecraft missions was developed by [9]. The knowledge
base consists of hand written rules of the form “if symptom then diagnosis”. However, the number
of rules grows exponentially in the number of components that the system consists of. Every rule
has to be manually formulated and then calibrated tediously, to fit as many fault cases as possible.
Even for moderate sized systems, this effort soon becomes infeasible. As a result, the rule set is almost
guaranteed to be incomplete. The diagnostic capabilities of such a system are also limited since only
those malfunctions can be detected, for which a rule was formulated. Additionally, the rule set cannot
be transferred from one spacecraft to another easily. Applying the fault detection system to another
spacecraft would require extensive re-engineering of the rule set.
Model-Based Diagnosis follows a different approach. Starting with the physical system,
a qualitative model is created to capture its nominal behavior [10,11]. During operation, the observed
behavior is compared with the expected behavior of the system, as given by the model through
simulation, and discrepancies are detected. Each discrepancy between the observed and the simulated
behavior is called a symptom. These symptoms are then used to compute diagnoses, mostly in a
qualitative fashion [12]. Hybrid systems, which use both quantitative models and expert systems, are
possible. The work described in [13] demonstrates the diagnosis of a fuel cell. It uses a quantitative
Dymola/Modelica model to compute symptoms in combination with an expert system to derive
diagnoses from these symptoms. While the power of expression of a quantitative model is superior to
that of a qualitative model, the drawbacks of the use of an expert system remain. Transferring the fault
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detection of [13] would require the complete re-engineering of not only the model, but also the rule
set. The approach of [14,15] describes a system for the diagnosis of motor vehicles. It uses a tabular
representation of the model components qualitative nominal and faulty behavior. To derive a diagnosis,
the available measured data is propagated backwards through the model graph, eliminating those
rows of the components behavior tables that are inconsistent with the observations. After the reduction
of the behavior tables, the components with reduced tables are assigned a score, based on the number
of rows left that can explain the observed symptoms. This MBD approach directly derives diagnoses
from a qualitative system description without the need for an expert system. This greatly reduces
the manual effort needed, as no rules need to be formulated by hand. Additionally, this approach
separates the model from the diagnostic algorithm, which makes the system transferable without the
need for extensive re-engineering. A drawback of this system is that it can only detect single faults and
relies on a qualitative model.
The most famous MBD applications that were used in satellite missions are Livingstone [16]
flown on board the Deep Space 1 spacecraft and its successor Livingstone 2 [17] flown on board the
Earth Observing One spacecraft. Livingstone uses a qualitative model to describe the different states
a component can have. Unlike [13], the nominal and faulty behaviors are modelled. The diagnostic
algorithm of Livingstone uses a conflict directed best first search to assign a nominal or fault state to
every component, so that the observed behavior of the system can be explained. The components that
have been assigned a fault state form the diagnosis. The use of a qualitative instead of a quantitative
model greatly reduces the accuracy of the model and the variety of component functions that can be
modelled, especially in regards to arithmetic operations, as the authors of [17,18] note in reflection of
their experiences with Livingstone 2. Additionally, many components can malfunction in arbitrary
many ways, most of which are difficult to anticipate in advance. Therefore, the need to describe the
faulty behavior of components might pose a problem for certain technical systems. Another MBD
application that was designed for the use in spacecraft missions is the approach of [19]. It uses a
quantitative Matlab/Simulink model for simulation. When a discrepancy between the observed and the
simulated behavior of a component is detected, diagnoses are derived by removing single components
one at a time and repeating the last simulation step for the remaining model. The order in which
components are removed is dependent on the number of connections to other components and their
reliability score, which has the character of an a priori failure probability. When one of these simulation
runs returns no discrepancy, the last removed component is the diagnosis. This method avoids the
exponential complexity of computing diagnoses directly and instead executes a number of simulations,
linear in the number of components, which the model consists of. A disadvantage of this approach
is that it can only diagnose single faults. Another disadvantage is that not every component can be
removed with the rest of the model still being simulatable in a meaningful way, therefore limiting the
diagnostic capabilities of the system. The FDI approach and the AI Model-Based Diagnosis are both
partially similar and comparable in terms of using some form of analytical redundancy. The authors
of [20] concluded that both approaches are equivalent in regards to their power of expression and
ability to detect malfunctions.
Our system is not deeply intertwined with a specific spacecraft but presents a generic approach to
fault detection and diagnosis that can be easily adapted to different spacecraft. Our approach aims at
using the power of expression of a quantitative model, while still being able to simultaneously detect
multiple malfunctions. It is not relying on proprietary libraries like Matlab/Simulink, making it suitable
to be ported to be used on board a spacecraft. Further, our approach strictly separates the model from
the diagnostic algorithm. The separation of model and diagnostic algorithm is especially important
for spacecraft, as software uploads are extremely time consuming. As the diagnostic capabilities
of the spacecraft can be adapted and expanded simply by adjusting the model, without the need
for changes to the underlying algorithm, only the model has to be uploaded, which minimizes the
size of the software upload. Additionally, our system allows for the update of model parameters at
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runtime without the need to recompile the model, and therefore minimizes the downtime due to the
recalibration of the model.
In this paper, we first briefly describe the classical approach to health monitoring performed by
human operators. Subsequently, we present the generic format and structure that is used for building a
model. The following sections describe the different parts of our fault detection and diagnosis system,
namely the simulation, the detection of discrepancies, and therefore the generation of symptoms, as
well as the computation of so-called conflict and hitting sets and give information on how models
are calibrated. We used the modified housekeeping data of the qualification model of the SONATE
Nano-satellite [21], a triple cube Nano-satellite built for the in-orbit verification of autonomous
detection, planning, and diagnosis technologies, to evaluate the fault detection system. We describe
the different experiments performed and show that the fault detection and diagnosis system is able to
detect the induced malfunctions, even those that are not apparent from the housekeeping data alone.
Further, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of our approach and give an outlook on future work.
2. Classical Health Monitoring and Fault Detection
Without a dedicated fault detection system, health monitoring is based on supervision by human
operators and telemetry parameter thresholds. The spacecraft is recording and storing its telemetry
data periodically during operation. This so-called housekeeping data is then transferred to a ground
station during contact times, where the telemetry data is displayed to human operators, primarily in
the form of ASCII characters.
Figure 1 shows the telemetry display of the telemetry client that was developed as part of the
ADIA++ [22] and ADIA-L Project, which is used during the SONATE project to display spacecraft
telemetry. It shows two telemetry pages of actual telemetry data of the qualification model of the
SONATE Nano-satellite. Some telemetry parameters have associated lower and upper threshold limits.
When a threshold limit is violated, a warning or alarm is generated and made visible to the operator.
Upon noticing, the operator can take measures.
Aerospace 2019, 6, x 4 of 36 
 
system, namely the simulation, the detection of discrepancies, and therefore the generation of 
symptoms, as well as the computation of so-called conflict and hitting sets and give information on 
how models are calibrated. We used the modified housekeeping data of the qualification model of 
the SONATE Nano-satellite [21], a triple cube Nano-satellite built for the in-orbit verification of 
autonomous detection, planning, and diagnosis technologies, to evaluate the fault detection system. 
We describe the different experiments performed and show that the fault detection and diagnosis 
system is able to detect the induced malfunctions, even those that are not apparent from the 
housekeeping data alone. Further, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of our approach and give 
an outlook on future work. 
2. Classical Health Monitoring and Fault Detection 
Without a dedicated fault detection system, health monitoring is based on supervision by human 
operators and telemetry parameter thresholds. The spacecraft is recording and storing its telemetry 
data periodically during operation. This so-called housekeeping data is then transferred to a ground 
station during contact times, where the telemetry data is displayed to human operators, primarily in 
the form of ASCII characters. 
Figure 1 shows the telemetry display of the telemetry client that was developed as part of the 
ADIA++ [22] and ADIA-L Project, which is used during the SONATE project to display spacecraft 
telemetry. It shows two telemetry pages of actual telemetry data of the qualification model of the 
SONATE Nano-satellite. Some telemetry parameters have associated lower and upper threshold 
limits. When a threshold limit is violated, a warning or alarm is generated and made visible to the 
operator. Upon noticing, the operator can take measures. 
 
Figure 1. Telemetry client displaying two telemetry pages of housekeeping data. 
Figure 2 shows a telemetry page with four violated threshold limits and the error display 
summarizing the threshold limit violations of the different telemetry parameters. When new 
telemetry data is received, the data is calibrated, the threshold limits are checked, and the data is 
displayed. By using the error display, the operator gets a quick overview of all limit violations that 
occurred. The operator then can view the associated telemetry pages to assess the situation further. 
Based on his expertise and knowledge of the system, the operator derives a conclusion regarding the 
type and severity of the occurred limit violation and the possible cause of it. In the next step, the 
operator can initiate counter measures. However, this procedure takes time to perform. The 
spacecraft itself might react to some threshold limit violations with switching into safe mode without 
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Figure 2 shows a telemetry page with four violated threshold limits and the error display
summarizing the threshold limit violations of the different telemetry parameters. When new telemetry
data is received, the data is calibrated, the threshold limits are checked, and the data is displayed.
By using the error display, the operator gets a quick overview of all limit violations that occurred.
Aerospace 2019, 6, 105 5 of 34
The operator then can view the associated telemetry pages to assess the situation further. Based on
his expertise and knowledge of the system, the operator derives a conclusion regarding the type and
severity of the occurred limit violation and the possible cause of it. In the next step, the operator can
initiate counter measures. However, this procedure takes time to perform. The spacecraft itself might
react to some threshold limit violations with switching into safe mode without operator interaction.
In that case, it is of importance to find out what caused the spacecraft to switch into safe mode.
However, while using this process, a malfunction can only be detected when a threshold limit was
violated. Ideally, a malfunction should be detected before a limit violation happens, as some threshold
limits might be critical to the spacecraft’s safety. Using only the telemetry data and an ASCII display,
like that of the telemetry client of Figure 1, this task becomes highly dependent on the operator’s
availability, expertise, and knowledge of the system. Observing all telemetry parameters at the same
time and detecting anomalies manually is difficult, even when multiple operators are present, as
anomalies might be very subtle, e.g., when monitoring a boost converter, given its input voltage and
current stemming from the power supply together with its output voltage and the current draw of the
consumers connected to it, it is difficult to decide whether the voltages and currents are acceptable.
The boost converter may still malfunction while no limit violation happened. The raw data alone
does not give information about whether a current of e.g., 0.45 A drawn from the power supply is
appropriate given the voltages and currents of the power supply and the current draw of the consumers.
The boost converters efficiency might have slowly deteriorated and increased the current draw from a
nominal value of e.g., 0.26 A to 0.45 A. However, the nominal value is not known to the operator, as it is
highly dynamic and dependent on the voltage and current of the power supply and the current draw of
all consumers. Identifying a malfunction before a threshold is violated shortens the duration between
the detection of the malfunction and the time of initiation of the first counter measure and it reduces
the impact of the malfunction on the spacecraft. A dedicated fault detection system might observe
different components and detect such anomalies. In case of the boost converter, the fault detection
system would try to infer the correct voltages and currents, given the appropriate measured data
and a functional description of the boost converters behavior and decide whether the boost converter
is malfunctioning.
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3. Model-Based Diagnosis
The approach that was employed in this paper is that of quantitative model-based diagnosis, with
the main principles following the qualitative approach of [7,8] and implemented in Java. For quantitative
model-based diagnosis, a quantitative model of the physical system is built, which captures its nominal
behavior. The model is preprocessed and then loaded into the simulation environment. Parts of the
housekeeping data are then used to simulate the model, to obtain simulated values, and therefore the
expected behavior of the spacecraft. After the simulation has been performed, the simulated values
are compared to the measured values from the housekeeping data and discrepancies are detected.
Each discrepancy is called a symptom. These symptoms are then used to compute so-called conflict
sets. These are sets of components on which the corresponding symptom components are dependent.
In a qualitative fashion, the malfunction of one component from the conflict set explains the associated
symptom components abnormal behavior. Finally, the minimal hitting sets are computed. A minimal
hitting set is a minimal set of components, such that it contains at least one component from every
conflict set. Therefore, each hitting set explains all symptoms. Each minimal hitting set corresponds to
one diagnosis.
The source code of the fault detection and diagnosis system can be provided by the authors
on personal request. Figure 3 shows an overview of the steps that were performed during the fault
detection and diagnosis process. The following sections describe the different algorithms in detail.
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3.1. Model and Simulator
A model has to be built first in order to be used within an application like model-based diagnosis.
The modeling is usually done by or with the help of the system engineers or other experts who have
enough knowledge about the system to capture all relevant information of the spacecraft. Components
are modelled on component class level first and then instantiated since many technical systems contain
multiple components of one class, e.g., multiple batteries of the same type. The component instances
are then port-wise interconnected to form a model.
3.1.1. Model Editor
Various modeling tools and languages can be found in the literature. Among them are Matlab/
Simulink used by [5,6,19], AD2L a language that was originally developed to interchange diagnostic
system descriptions over the internet and later adapted for industrial needs [23], which enables users
to build diagnostic models without the need to be specific to the underlying diagnosis algorithm [24],
Dymola/Modelica a modeling suite comparable to Matlab/Simulink used by [13] and system specific
languages like the one used in [16]. For usability and deployment reasons, we use Microsoft Excel
as model editor and Python inline code for the description of the components behavior. Since, often,
knowledge from different engineers of a technical system is needed, an easy to use and easy to deploy
solution for building the model has been chosen.
3.1.2. Component Class Format
Each component class consists of a name, an a priori failure probability, arbitrary many inputs, and
arbitrary many outputs, each with a quantitative description, defining how the corresponding output
values are computed. The inputs of a component are also referred to as input ports or inports and
outputs are also referred to as output ports or outports. Each component class needs to have a unique
name. The instances of a component class can have arbitrary names. The a priori failure probabilities
should be picked by the systems engineers or other qualified experts based on component tests during
the early phases of the engineering process of the spacecraft or based on experience. An educated guess
can be made when no such knowledge is obtainable. Each input port of a component class consists of
a name, unique within the component class, an abbreviated name that is later displayed in the model
graph, a datatype, a lower threshold limit, an upper threshold limit, and an optional unit. Each output
port of a component class is defined the same way as an input, with the exception that every output
port additionally has a relative tolerance interval value, an absolute tolerance interval value and it is
additionally associated with a quantitative description. These quantitative descriptions are functions
of the type outputi = f (X), X ⊆ INPORTS, i = 1, . . . , n, with INPORTS being the set of input ports of
the corresponding component class and n being the number of output ports of the component class.
Each quantitative description is formulated as Python inline code. Additionally, for each component
class, arbitrary many error functions can be defined. These error functions are used to describe known
abnormal behavior explicitly. Error functions are similar to the quantitative descriptions of the outputs,
with the exception that they can be defined using both the inputs and outputs of the corresponding
component class. Each error function is given a probability and a descriptive text describing the
formulated abnormal behavior, as well as the error function itself.
Figure 4 shows an example component class definition of a boost converter with an a priori failure
probability of 0.2. There are 10 inputs and two outputs defined, e.g., the output port “CurrentDrawOut”
with the abbreviated name “CDO” is parametrized with datatype double, a lower threshold of 0.0,
an upper threshold of 4.0, a relative tolerance interval of 0.05, an absolute tolerance interval of 0.15,
unit “A”, and a quantitative description. The abbreviated name “CDO” is later displayed in the model
graph, next to the respective port of the instances of the Boostconverter component class. The defined
error function has a probability of 0.2, a descriptive text, and a quantitative description, defining if the
respective error is present or not. In this case, it checks whether the output voltage of the Boostconverter
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is higher than 5.2 V. If this is the case, the Boostconverter is producing overvoltage and the special
variable “error” is set to true, meaning that the described error is present; or else, it is set to false. No
meaningful direct comparison between simulated and measured values can be performed without
tolerance intervals, as they will diverge from each other in most cases, since noise and quantization
errors affect the measured values. When a simulated value lies within the tolerance intervals of a
measured value, both values are considered to be equal. The absolute tolerance interval is given as
an absolute value and is used to mitigate the effect of quantization errors and the relative tolerance
interval is given as a value in percent and is used to compensate for noise. Section 3.3.1 explains
the use of tolerance intervals in more detail. A component with no inputs and with outputs, which
have quantitative descriptions, is called an emitter. Emitters usually produce either fixed or random
values via their outputs. A component with no inputs and with outputs, which have no quantitative
descriptions, is called a sensor component. This type of component is used to explicitly model sensors.
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3.1.3. Connector For at
Once the co ponent classes have been defined, they can be instantiated and port ise
interconnected to for a odel. Therefore, a different Excel spreadsheet ith three tables is used.
The first table, the “components” table, contains the instance names of the component instances and the
name of the component class that has to be instantiated. These instances correspond to the components
of the real technical system. The co ponents of a model form the set V of vertices of the model
graph. The second table, the “forward connector” table, contains the port connections, which are
simulated during each time step by forward propagation. The set of forward connections is called
E f orward. The third table, for a better distinction, called the “back ards connector” table, contains the
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port connections, which are simulated once at the beginning of the simulation of a time step, while
using data from the previous iteration. The set of backward connections is called Ebackward. The model
graph G =
(
V, E f orward, Ebackward
)
contains all components, as well as all connections between the ports
of the different components.
Figure 5 shows an example of a components table and a forward connector table. In the components
table, the column “Id” contains the instance name of the component instance to be created and the
“Type” column contains the component class that has to be instantiated. For the forward connector
and backward connector table, the syntax for the column “Output” is component_inctance.outport and
for the “Input” column the syntax is component_instance.inport. Each row of the forward connector and
backward connector table reads: “component_instance.outport is connected to component_instance.inport”.
For all of the connections, only those ports can be referenced that have been previously defined in the
respective component class. To guarantee a fixed simulation sequence, there are no loops allowed in
the model on port level during forward propagation, i.e., an outport is not allowed to have a connection
to an inport on which it is dependent. Therefore, the graph G f orward =
(
V, E f orward
)
has to be acyclic on
port level.
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i re 7 ill strates a l rt le el is elle . s ste c tai i a l (a) is
o elle by changing one connection of the loop from a forward connection to a backward connection
(b), so that the computation of the loop is done in two time steps (c). During time step i, A produces an
output, while using the output of B from the previous ti e ste , or an initial value, if the current time
step is the first one. Afterwards, B uses the output of A to produce its wn out ut. At the beginning of
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time step i + 1 the output of B from time step i is used as input of A. With the use of feedback loops,
memory and operations like incrementation of a value can be modelled.Aerospace 2019, 6, x 10 of 36 
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Figure 8. a le of a co onent co puting x = x + 1.
3.1.4. Port Dependencies
An important preprocessing step for both the simulation and the diagnosis is the computation of
port dependencies. There are two types of dependencies:
• The static port dependencies map each outport of each component to the inports that are needed
to compute a value for the corresponding outport, independent of the actual inport values.
These port dependencies are all inports, which are part of the quantitative description of the
corresponding outport. hen the outport of a component is simulated, it is first checked, if the
values for all inports on which the outport is dependent are available.
• The dynamic port dependencies are used for the computation of conflict sets during the diagnosis.
These port dependencies map each outport of each component to the inports on which the
corresponding outport is dependent during the current time step, given the available values for the
inports. These port dependencies are updated after each simulation, since the port dependencies
can change in respect to the values of the inports.
Figure 9 shows an example quantitative description of an output with two inputs. If input1 is
greater than 0, then the output becomes dependent on input1 and input2, or else the output is only
dependent on input1. There exists a special parser and tree walker, which analyses the quantitative
descriptions of the different components and generates data structures that allow for the update of
port dependencies, given the measured and simulated values for the different inports.
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Figure 9. Example quantitative description of an output with two inputs
Figure 10 shows an excerpt of the context free ANTLR grammar, used by the parser to analyze the
port dependencies. The quantitative expressions of each outport are split into parts, e.g., “ifBlock”,
“elseifBlock”, and “elseBlock” consisting of expressions that can be evaluated, e.g., “booleanExpression”
and “arithmeticExpression”. The Boolean and arithmetic expressions are evaluated by order of their
if-elseif-else parts, while using the data of the current time step. The ports contained in the respective
if-elseif-else part to apply first are added to the dynamic port dependencies. This procedure is repeated
recursively, as the grammar allows for nesting of expressions. These dynamic port dependencies are
later used to limit the number of components that have to be considered during the computation of the
conflict sets, as described in Section 3.3.2.
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3.2. Simulation
After a model is created, it can be used for simulation. The simulator is not bound to a single
model, as the model is separated from the simulator. Any model built in accordance to the format of
Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 can be simulated. For simulation, the model is preprocessed and transformed
into the software’s internal data structures. The components are instantiated according to the connector,
their input and output ports are made unique and their quantitative descriptions are accordingly
adjusted. The quantitative descriptions are parsed and the port dependency data structures are created.
The static port dependencies are computed. Variable assignment functions and the different adjusted
quantitative expressions of the component instances are pre-compiled and loaded within the execution
environment. The model graphs G f orward, Gbackward, and G are built and the simulator is initialized. The
pseudo code of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 describes how the simulation of a time step is performed.
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Algorithm 1. Pseudo code of the SimulateInitial-function of the simulator, used to perform initial 
computations e.g., the simulation of emitters and to initialize the necessary data structures for further 
simulation of the model. 
ALGORITHM: SimulateInitial 
INPUTS:  The set of simulated outputs from the previous iteration: 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆௢௟ௗ 
The set of measured inputs from the current iteration: 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷_𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆 
The set of measured outputs from the current iteration: 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷_𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆 
The set of model components: 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆 
The set of forward connections: 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 
The set of backward connections: 𝐵𝐴𝐶𝐾𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 
OUTPUTS: The set of simulated outputs: 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆 
1. Map outputs from 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆௢௟ௗ to inputs 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆, using 𝐵𝐴𝐶𝐾𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 
2. Let 𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆 be an empty set of input values. Merge 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷_𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆 and 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆 into 
𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆 
3. Map all outputs from 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷_𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆 to inputs, using 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 and merge them with 
𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆 
4. Let 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆 be an empty set of output values 
5. Let 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆 be an empty set of components to consider for simulation 
6. Let 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆 be an empty map of components to sets of ports to keep track which ports of which 
components have been simulated already 
7. Determine the set of components 𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆, that cannot be simulated during the current 
iteration of the simulation 
8. Simulate all emitter components, map their outputs to inputs and merge them with 𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆. Add all 
components connected to them that are not in 𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆 to 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆 
9. Check 𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆 and add all components, that have at least one 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 ∈ 𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆 and are not in 
𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆 to 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆 
10.  IF 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆 ! = {} THEN 
SimulateRecursive(𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆, 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆, 𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆, 
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ELSE 
RETURN 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆 
  
The simulation not only uses the primary inputs, i.e., sensor data and external inputs, but all the
available measured data. For a port, there might exist a measured and a simulated value simultaneously.
When this occurs, the measured value overwrites the simulated one. This is used to ensure that the
model is being simulated with as many values from the real technical system as possible, in order to
prevent an accumulation of errors due to modelling errors. The following figure illustrates the need
for value overwrites:
Figure 11 shows the behavior of a hypothetical real technical system on the left and its corresponding
model on the right, while assuming the absence of noise. Most models only approximate the real
behavior with certain accuracy since it is difficult to capture the behavior of a real technical system
perfectly. In this case, the behavior of the real technical system and its model deviate by an error of
 > 0. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that f (in) = in + 1. If the input of the component from
Figure 11 is replaced by a measured value each iteration, then the accumulated error per iteration
would be . If the simulated value would not be overwritten by the measured value, then after x
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iterations, the accumulated error would be x · . For a great enough x, the modeling error would
become so large that no meaningful comparison of the observed and the simulated values could be
done, as the accuracy of the model then only depends on the number of simulated time steps, i.e., the
number of housekeeping frames.Aerospace 2019, 6, x 2 of 5 
 
Algorithm 2. Pseudo code of the SimulateRecursive-function of the simulator, used to perform the simulation 
of model components in a recursive fashion. 
ALGORITHM: SimulateRecursive 
INPUTS:  The set of all input values: 𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆 
The set of forward connections: 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 
The set of unsimulatable components: 𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆 
The set of current candidates: 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆 
The map of currently simulated components: 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆 
The set of currently simulated outputs: 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆 
OUTPUTS: The set of simulated outputs: 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆 
1. Let 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆௡௘௪ be an empty set of components to consider for simulation 
2. FOR EACH 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∈ 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆 
IF 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 has ports that are simulatable and are not contained in 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆 
THEN 
    𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠௖௔௡ௗ௜ௗ௔௧௘ = simulate new simulatable ports 
    Merge 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠௖௔௡ௗ௜ௗ௔௧௘ into 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆 
Map 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠௖௔௡ௗ௜ௗ௔௧௘ to inputs, using 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 and merge them with 
𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆 
    IF 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆 contains all outports of 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 THEN 
     𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 is finished and won’t be considered again for simulation 
    Add all components connected to 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 to 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆௡௘௪ 
3. IF 𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆௡௘௪ ! = {} THEN 
SimulateRecursive(𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇_𝑉𝐴𝐿𝑈𝐸𝑆, 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆, 𝑈𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆, 
𝐶𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆௡௘௪, 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑆, 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆) 
ELSE 
RETURN 𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑈𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷_𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆 
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Figure 11. The behavior of a real technical system (a) and its model with modelling error (b). 
3.3 Diagnostic Algorithm 
A simulation is first performed before a diagnosis is computed. The simulation yields simulated 
values, which are later used to detect discrepancies and to compute symptoms. With the use of the 
measured and simulated values, symptoms are derived, the heuristic error functions are evaluated, 
conflict sets are determined, and finally hitting sets are computed. After the simulation, the original 
measured values are merged with the simulated values. If there is simultaneously a measured and a 
simulated value available for the same port, the measured value overwrites the simulated one. These 
merged values are then used to update the dynamic port dependencies, as described in Section 3.1.4. 
3.3.1 Symptoms 
After the simulation of a time step has been completed, a check for threshold limit violations 
and discrepancies between the observed and expected behavior of components is performed. Every 
limit violation and discrepancy between the observed behavior of a component and its expected 
behavior is called a symptom. The observed behavior is given by the measured values and the 
expected behavior is given by the simulated values of the different components. A discrepancy is 
detected, and therefore a symptom is computed when either of the following holds true: 
• The measured value of an outport is smaller than its lower threshold limit 
• The measured value of an outport is greater than its upper threshold limit 
• The deviation of the measured value of an outport from its corresponding simulated value 
violates its tolerance intervals 
If any of the above conditions hold true for the port 𝑝 of a component 𝑐, then a symptom 𝑠 is 
created. However, the tolerance intervals need special consideration. The tolerance intervals are 
divided into absolute and relative tolerance intervals. The absolute tolerance intervals are mainly 
used to mitigate the effects of the quantization error of the sensors. Assuming that a sensor is used to 
measure a current range of 0 A to 3.2 A with a resolution of 8-bit, the 8-bit resolution results in 256 
discrete quantization levels. For the current range of 0 A to 3.2 A each quantization level corresponds 
to 12.5 mA. Depending on the sensor, this value or multiples of this value can be used as the absolute 
tolerance interval. The relative tolerance intervals are used to mitigate the effect of noise and model 
errors and are determined during model calibration. During the calibration phase, the average 
achieved accuracy is used as the initial relative tolerance interval. During a comparison of a simulated 
value 𝑣௦௜௠ with its corresponding measured value 𝑣௠௘௔௦, first the absolute tolerance value 𝑡௔௕௦ is 
considered. If 𝑣௠௘௔௦ + 𝑡௔௕௦ ≥ 𝑣௦௜௠ ≥ 𝑣௠௘௔௦ − 𝑡௔௕௦ holds true, then 𝑣௦௜௠ and 𝑣௠௘௔௦ are considered to 
be equal, or else the relative tolerance interval 𝑡௥௘௟  is considered. If 𝑣௠௘௔௦ ⋅ (1 + 𝑡௥௘௟) ≥ 𝑣௠௘௔௦ ≥
𝑣௠௘௔௦ ⋅ (1 − 𝑡௥௘௟) holds true, then 𝑣௦௜௠ and 𝑣௠௘௔௦ are considered equal; else, a symptom is created. 
The component 𝑐 is then called a symptom component and 𝑝 the symptom port of symptom 𝑠. 
If there is at least one simulatable output port and there exist measured values for all simulatable 
output ports of a component 𝑐 and 𝑐 is not a symptom component, then 𝑐 is considered to be 
correctly working and it is called an excluded component. 
i
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3.3. Diagnostic Algorithm
A simulation is first performed before a diagnosis is computed. The simulation yields simulated
values, which are later used to detect discrepancies and to compute symptoms. With the use of the
measured and simulated values, symptoms are derived, the heuristic error functions are evaluated,
conflict sets are determined, and finally hitting sets are computed. After the simulation, the original
measured values are merged with the simulated values. If there is simultaneously a measured and a
simulated value available for the same port, the measured value overwrites the simulated one. These
merged values are then used to update the dynamic port dependencies, as described in Section 3.1.4.
3.3.1. Symptoms
After the simulation of a time step has been completed, a check for threshold limit violations and
discrepancies between the observed and expected behavior of components is performed. Every limit
violation and discrepancy between the observed behavior of a component and its expected behavior is
called a symptom. The observed behavior is given by the measured values and the expected behavior
is given by the simulated values of the different components. A discrepancy is detected, and therefore
a symptom is computed when either of the following holds true:
• The measured value of an outport is smaller than its lower threshold limit
• The measured value of an outport is greater than its upper threshold limit
• The deviation of the measured value of an outport from its corresponding simulated value violates
its tolerance intervals
If any of the above conditions hold true for the port p of a component c, then a symptom s is
created. However, the tolerance intervals need special consideration. The tolerance intervals are
divided into absolute and relative tolerance intervals. The absolute tolerance intervals are mainly
used to mitigate the effects of the quantization error of the sensors. Assuming that a sensor is used to
measure a current range of 0 A to 3.2 A with a resolution of 8-bit, the 8-bit resolution results in 256
discrete quantization levels. For the current range of 0 A to 3.2 A each quantization level corresponds
to 12.5 mA. Depending on the sensor, this value or multiples of this value can be used as the absolute
tolerance interval. The relative tolerance intervals are used to mitigate the effect of noise and model
errors and are determined during model calibration. During the calibration phase, the average achieved
accuracy is used as the initial relative tolerance interval. During a comparison of a simulated value
vsim with its corresponding measured value vmeas, first the absolute tolerance value tabs is considered.
If vmeas + tabs ≥ vsim ≥ vmeas − tabs holds true, then vsim and vmeas are considered to be equal, or else
the relative tolerance interval trel is considered. If vmeas · (1 + trel) ≥ vmeas ≥ vmeas · (1− trel) holds true,
then vsim and vmeas are considered equal; else, a symptom is created. The component c is then called a
symptom component and p the symptom port of symptom s.
If there is at least one simulatable output port and there exist measured values for all simulatable
output ports of a component c and c is not a symptom component, then c is considered to be correctly
working and it is called an excluded component.
Generally, all of the components that have a quantitative description should be simulatable.
However, in rare cases, output ports of components that are not sensor components might not be
simulatable due to the unavailability of certain measured values. This is a special case and it occurs
when a component requires the unavailable output values of a sensor component to compute a value
for one of its own outports. The modelling of partial knowledge needs to be carefully considered to
avoid undefined model behavior. The modelling of such cases should only be done for output ports
for which there exist measured values and whose quantitative description equals the operation that
directly forwards the value from one of their input ports via the respective outport in the absence of
the unavailable sensor values, which cause the outport to be unsimulatable.
The measured and simulated values, port dependencies, symptoms and excluded components form
the model state of a time step, also called an iteration. After the symptoms have been computed, the error
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functions of each symptom component are evaluated. If an error function applies, its description text,
together with its probability, is mapped to the corresponding symptom component. These probabilities
later overwrite the associated components failure probability when the scores are computed.
3.3.2. Computation of Conflict Sets
A conflict set CSsc, is a set of components, corresponding to a symptom component sc, for which
holds that a malfunction of one of the components c ∈ CSsc would explain the symptom associated
with sc. The set of all conflict sets is denoted as CSS. A basic conflict set for a symptom component sc
would contain each component c, for which there exists a path of dependent port connections from c to
sc in the model graph. The computation time of diagnoses may potentially grow exponentially in the
number and size of all conflict sets. Therefore, it is of importance to reduce the size of the conflict sets
before diagnoses are computed. The pseudo code of Algorithm 3 describes how the conflict set CSsc
for a symptom component sc is computed.Aerospace 2019, 6, x 3 of 5 
 
Algorithm 3. Pseudo code of the ComputeConflictSet-function used to compute a conflict set, given a 
symptom component, so that a malfunction of a component of the conflict set would explain the observed 
symptoms of the symptom component. 
ALGORITHM: ComputeConflictSet 
INPUTS:  The symptom component to compute a conflict set for: 𝑠𝑐 
   The dynamic port dependencies: 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠 
The set of measured outputs of the current iteration: 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷_𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇𝑆 
   The model graph: 𝐺 
   The set of all symptom components: 𝑆𝐶 
   The set of all excluded components: 𝐸𝐶 
   The model state of the previous iteration: 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 
OUTPUTS:  The conflict set 𝐶𝑆௦௖  corresponding to 𝑠𝑐 and the map of components to sets of  
suspecting components 𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 
1. Let 𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆 be an empty set of output ports. Merge the symptom ports of the symptoms associated with 
𝑠𝑐 into 𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆 
2. Let 𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 be an empty map of components to sets of suspecting components 
3. Use 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠 to compute for each 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ∈ 𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆 the inputs 𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇_𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆 on which 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 is 
dependent and use 𝐺 to identify the output ports 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇_𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆, which are connected to the input ports 
of 𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇_𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆. Search the whole model graph using a backwards directed breadth-first search. Replace 
𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆 with 𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇_𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑆 before continuing with the next level. Before visiting a component 𝑐 
through an output port 𝑝, take an action based on the following conditions: 
• If 𝑐 is a symptom component, continue the search 
• If 𝑐 is an excluded component, do not visit 𝑐 
• If 𝑐 is neither a symptom component, nor an excluded component and there exists no 
measured and simulated value simultaneously for 𝑝, continue the search 
• If 𝑐 is neither a symptom component, nor an excluded component and there exists a 
measured and a simulated value for 𝑝, do not visit 𝑐 
• If 𝑐 was reached through a backwards connection, check the above conditions, but use 
the models previous state 
If a component 𝑐 is visited and 𝑐 is not a symptom component, it is suspected by 𝑠𝑐 and added to the set 
of components that suspect 𝑐 in 𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆. The set of all visited components is the conflict set 𝐶𝑆௦௖ of 
𝑠𝑐 
4. RETURN 𝐶𝑆௦௖  and 𝑆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝐼𝐶𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑆 
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It is to be noted that, when a component has been reached from a backwards connection, further
backwards connections are ignored. Therefore, the search is limited to the system state of the current
and previous time step. A similar computation is done for each excluded component ec, yielding
the map of components to sets of relieving components EXCLUSIONS. The maps SUSPICIONS and
EXCLUSIONS are then used to calculate a suspicion score for each component c, determining whether
c is suspicious or not suspicious by comparing the suspicions and exclusions for each component,
weighted by the respective suspecting or relieving components a priori failure probability. If c is found
not to be suspicious, c is removed from all conflict sets. While the backwards directed breadth-first
search is using port dependencies and the model state to limit the amount and length of paths to
visit, the suspicions and exclusions are used to remove unlikely malfunctioning components from
the remaining paths. Assuming the conflict sets as paths, after the non-suspicious components are
removed, the remaining paths can contain gaps.
3.3.3. Computation of Hitting Sets
A hitting set HS is as set of components, for which holds, that if all components c ∈ HS are
malfunctioning, all of the observed symptoms would be explained. Interpreting the components c ∈ CSi,
i ∈ COMPONENTS as literals, conflict sets can be seen as Boolean formulae CSi = ∨ci∈CSici = c1 ∨ . . .∨
cn. A hitting set then can be described as the solution to the Boolean formula HS = ∧CSi∈CSSCSi =(
c1,1 ∨ . . .∨ c1,n1
)
∧ . . .∧ (cm,1 ∨ . . .∨ cm,nm), ci, j ∈ CSi. A minimal hitting set is a hitting set that cannot
be subsumed by any other hitting set. Each minimal hitting set, HS corresponds to one diagnosis.
Minimal hitting sets can be computed with the help of a SAT-solver [25,26]. The simplest procedure to
compute all possible hitting sets given the formula above is to solve the Boolean formula first, and
then after a solution has been found, the solution has to be negated, added as a blocking clause to the
formula and another solution has to be derived. This has to be repeated until no solutions can be found.
As the fault detection system is supposed to be ported to run on board the SONATE-Nano satellite,
a SAT-solver is not lightweight enough. Therefore, a different approach of hitting set computation
has been used, which offers high quality results for the relevant model sizes, while having low
computational cost [27]. Based on the Hitting Set Directed Acyclic Graph (HSDAG) of [28], which is a
modified version of the Hitting Set Tree (HSTree) by [7], a Scored Hitting Set Directed Acyclic Graph
(SHSDAG) has been implemented, utilizing node reusing, regular edge pruning techniques, and score
based edge pruning to reduce the computation time of diagnoses. The pseudo code of Algorithm 4
describes how a SHSDAG is built.
The node state of a node node can be either one of the following:
• open, when node has child nodes
• closed, when the path from n0 to node is a dead end and does not correspond to a hitting set
• end_o f _path, when the path from n0 to node corresponds to a minimal hitting set
The label of a node is a set of components. The label of an edge is a single component. Each path
from the root of the SHSDAG to a node, labeled as end_o f _path, is a minimal hitting set. The score
for a path PATH is calculated by multiplying the a priori failure probabilities or when available the
suspicion scores of each component c ∈ PATH. These scores have the character of a pseudo probability.
To reduce the size of the SHSDAG and to ensure that only minimal hitting sets are being computed,
additional to the algorithm above, the following node-reuse and node-termination rules are being used.
Node-reuse rule:
• If a new child node childNode for a node node is to be created, due to a component c, while there
exists a node node′, with path(node′) = path(node) ∪ c, then childNode is not created, but node′ is
added to the child nodes of node.
Node-termination rules:
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• If the SHSDAG contains a node node′ after a node node has been created, with path(node′) ⊂
path(node), then close node
• If the score cut-off is used with a cut-off factor cutO f f Factor and the score of a newly created node
node is score(path(node)) < minScore · cutO f f Factor, then close node
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Algorithm 4. Pseudo code of the BuildSHSDAG-function used to build a Scored Hitting Set Directed Acyclic 
Graph (SHSDAG) and therefore to compute the minimal hitting sets, given a set of conflict sets. 
ALGORITHM: BuildSHSDAG 
INPUTS:  The set of all conflict sets: 𝐶𝑆𝑆 
OUTPUTS: The SHSDAG: SHSDAG 
1. Use logical absorption on the 𝐶𝑆 ∈ 𝐶𝑆𝑆 
2. Sort 𝐶𝑆𝑆 ascending by cardinality 
3. Let 𝑛଴ be the empty root node of the SHSDAG 
4. Let 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 be an empty list of nodes 
5. Let 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 be an empty list of nodes 
6. Add 𝑛଴ to 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 
7. WHILE 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 is not empty 
  FOR EACH 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 ∈ 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 
   Let 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐻 be the set of edge labels of the path from 𝑛଴ to 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 
   FOR EACH 𝐶𝑆 ∈ 𝐶𝑆𝑆 
    IF 𝐶𝑆 ∩ 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐻 = ∅ THEN 
     Label 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 with 𝐶𝑆 
     BREAK 
   IF 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 was labeled with 𝐶𝑆 THEN 
    FOR EACH 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝑆 
     Let 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 be an empty node with state 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛 
     Add 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 as child node to 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 
     Set the path of 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 to 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐻 ∪ 𝑐 
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     Compute a score for 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 based on its new path 
     Add 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 to 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 
   ELSE 
    Set the state of 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 to 𝑒𝑛𝑑_𝑜𝑓_𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ 
  Set 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 to 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 
  Set 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 to an empty list of nodes 
8. RETURN the SHSDAG 
 
The cut-off rule can be parametrized with the so-called cut-off factor. The cut-off factor describes
how likely a diagnosis has to be at least, relative to the minScore, the probability of the diagnosis in
which all of the symptom components are simultaneously malfunctioning. The cut-off factor can be
manually set. Optionally, the fault detection system starts with a high cut-off factor and iteratively
adapts it until a single diagnosis is computed. The following example illustrates how a SHSDAG is
built, and therefore minimal hitting sets are computed by starting with the set of conflict sets and
building the SHSDAG step by step:
Assuming that, for a model, the symptom components {A, C, E} have been found. The computation
and reduction of the conflict sets has finished and the conflict sets are CSA = {A, B, C, H}, CSC = {C, B, D}
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and CSE = {E, H, B}. After sorting by cardinality the set of conflict sets CSS is CSS = {CSC, CSE, CSA} =
{{C, B, D}, {E, H, B}, {A, B, C, H}}. The failure probabilities of the components are given by P(A) = 0.5,
P(B) = 0.2, P(C) = 0.6, P(E) = 0.5, P(D) = 0.5, and P(H) = 0.2. The pseudo probability minScore is
minScore = P(A) · P(C) · P(E) = 0.5 · 0.6 · 0.5 = 0.15 and the cut-off factor is set to 1.0.
To build the SHSDAG, first the root node n0 is created, as depicted in Figure 12.
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Figure 12. The root node n0 of the SHSDAG, initially without label and with a pseudo probability score
of 1.
Subsequently, for each CS ∈ CSS, path(n0) ∩ CS is computed. As path(n0) = ∅ and path(n0) ∩
CSc = ∅, n0 is labeled with CSC, as depicted in Figure 13.
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Figure 13. The root node n0 of the SHSDAG, after being labeled with CSc = {C, B, D}.
For eac c ∈ CSC, a new child node is created and its path, as well as its score is updated. Figure 14
shows the SHSDAG after this step.
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e S S after the expansion of the r ot node n0. The new child nodes n1, n2 n3
have b en created and their paths and scores have been updated.
As there are no other nodes on the same level as n0, the nodes of the next level are processed. First
n1, with path(n1) = C is examined. As C
⋂
CSC , ∅, CSE = {E, H, B} is looked at. n1 is labeled with
CSE, because C∩CSE = ∅. The same is repeated for n2. In opposite to n1, n2 is labeled as end_o f _path,
because for each CS ∈ CSS, the intersection path(n2) ∩CS is not empty. This makes HS0 = {B}, with
P(HS0) = 0.2, the first found hitting set. The node n3 is labeled with CSE in the same way. Figure 15
shows the SHSDAG after the expansion of n1 and n3.
On the next level, the nodes n4, n5, n6, n7, n8, and n9 are examined. As the pseudo probability
of n5 being P(n5) = 0.12 is smaller than minProbability · cutO f f Factor = 0.15 · 1.0 = 0.15, a cut-off is
made and n5 is closed. For the same reason n8 is closed. For n6 and n9, besides the cut-off rule, the first
termination-rule also applies, since path(n2) ⊂ path(n6) and path(n2) ⊂ path(n9), which causes n6 and
n9 to be closed. The path of n4 has a non-empty intersection with each of the CS ∈ CSS and it is labeled
as end_o f _path, making HS1 = {C, E}, with P(HS1) = 0.3 the second found hitting set. The node n7 is
expanded, due to having an empty intersection with CSA. Figure 16 shows the SHSDAG after this step.
The nodes n10, n11, and n13 are closed by applying the cut-off rule. Additionally, for n11 and n12,
the first termination-rule applies. Figure 17 shows the SHSDAG after the computation of hitting sets
has finished.
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in green). 
On the next level, the nodes 𝑛ସ , 𝑛ହ , 𝑛଺ , 𝑛଻ , 𝑛଼ , and 𝑛ଽ  are examined. As the pseudo 
probability of 𝑛ହ being 𝑃(𝑛ହ) = 0.12 is smaller than 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ⋅ 𝑐𝑢𝑡𝑂𝑓𝑓𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 = 0.15 ⋅ 1.0 =
0.15, a cut-off is made and 𝑛ହ is closed. For the same reason 𝑛଼ is closed. For 𝑛଺ and 𝑛ଽ, besides 
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As there are no more open nodes, the algorithm terminates. The computed hitting sets are
HS0 = {B}, with P(HS0) = 0.2, and HS1 = {C, E}, with P(HS1) = 0.3. In total two diagnoses have
been computed. The diagnoses are then ranked by their probability, which results in the ranking HS1,
HS0. By choosing a different cut-off factor, it is possible to determine which minimal probability the
diagnoses should have, relative to the probability of the diagnosis in which all symptom components
are simultaneously malfunctioning. For example a cut-off factor of 2.0 would return the diagnosis HS0
and a cut-off factor of 0.5 would return the diagnoses HS0, HS1, HS2 = {C, H}, with P(HS2) = 0.12,
and HS3 = {D, H}, with P(HS3) = 0.1.
4. Satellite Model
The power supply of the qualification model of the SONATE Nano-satellite was modelled to
evaluate the fault detection system. The power supply consists of two Power Control Units (PCU), two
main energy supply busses and different consumers connected to the buses.
Figure 18 shows the complete model graph, as displayed in the diagnosis view of the telemetry
client, when no data is supplied. The graphs main purpose is to inform the operator of detected
malfunctions. During operation, components that are deemed to function correctly are displayed in
green, components which are suspected to malfunction are displayed in red and components for which
there is not enough information to identify them as either malfunctioning or working correctly are
displayed in blue.
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Figure 19 shows a schematic overview of the model graph that is displayed in Figure 18. In this
figure, the connections between the different components have been reduced to one connection each.
Some connections are depicted with dotted lines in order to increase the readability of the figure.
The instances of each component class share the same name but are numbered differently, e.g., “Bus1”
and “Bus2” are both instances of the component class “Bus”. Table 1 gives an overview of the
component classes modelled:
Most consumers that are redundantly available are connected to one bus each, e.g., Transceiver1
is connected to Bus1 and Transceiver2 is connected to Bus2. Consumers that are not redundantly
available, like the ASAP payload, an autonomous short-term phenomenon detection and planning
system, as well as the OBDHConv and OBDH components, can be powered by both busses.
Aerospace 2019, 6, 105 21 of 34
Aerospace 2019, 6, x 22 of 36 
Figure 19 shows a schematic overview of the model graph that is displayed in Figure 18. In this 
figure, the connections between the different components have been reduced to one connection each. 
Some connections are depicted with dotted lines in order to increase the readability of the figure. 
The instances of each component class sh
Figure 19. Schematic overview of the complete model graph from Figure 18. 
Table 1. Overview of the different modelled component classes. 
Component Instances Description 
Battery 2
A battery pack consisting of 4 single batteries. The main power 
source of the satellite. 
Solarpanel 4 A single solar panel, explicitly modelled as a sensor component 
Boostconverter 2 
The PCUs boost converter is used to generate a stable bus voltage. 
Since most consumers need a voltage higher, than the main power 
supply can provide, each of the two power supply busses uses one 
of these converters. 
Bus 2
The power supply bus is used to connect the consumers to the 
main power supply via a boost converter. 
Magnetorquer 2 
The magnetorquer component combines three actual 
magnetorquers. A ferrite core coil (X-direction) and two air core 
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Terminationboard 2 Connects three single physical magnetorquers in either positive or negative X-, Y-, Z-direction to a power supply bus. 
Reactionwheel 3 A single experimental reaction wheel. 
ASAP 1 The ASAP-payload.
AROS 2 The AROS-payload.
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Table 1. Overview of the differ e led component classes.
Component Instances Description
Battery 2 A battery pack consisting of 4 single batteries. The main power source of thesatellite.
Solarp nel 4 A single solar panel, explicitly mo ll as a sensor compone t
Boostconverter 2
The PCUs boost converter is used to generate a stable bus voltage. Since most
consumers need a voltage higher, than the main power supply can provide, each
of the two power supply busses uses one of these converters.
Bus 2 The power supply bus is used to connect the consumers to the main powersupply via a boost converter.
Magnetorquer 2 The magnetorquer component combines three actual magnetorquers. A ferritecore coil (X-direction) and two air core coils (Y- and Z- direction) are used.
Terminationboard 2 Connects three single physical magnetorquers in either positive or negative X-,Y-, Z-direction to a power supply bus.
Reactionwheel 3 A single xpe imental reaction wheel.
ASAP 1 The ASAP-payload.
AROS 2 The AROS-payload.
Int faceboard1 1 Connects two reaction wheels, an AROS unit and ASAP to a power supply bus.
Interfaceboard2 1 Connects a reaction wheel, an AROS unit and ASAP to a power supply bus.
ADCSConv 2 The voltage converter of the attitude determination and control system.
ADC 2 The attitude determination and control system.
Magnetometer 4 The magnetometer of the ADCS.
Gyro 4 The gyro of the ADCS.
Transceiver 2 The transceiver of the satellite.
HISPICO 2 A single HISPICO device.
SSTV 2 A SSTV device.
PCU 2 The dedicated microcontroller of the PCU.
ADIA 2 The ADIA-payload.
OBDHConv 4 The voltage converter of the on board computer.
OBDH 4 The on board computer of the satellite.
SunSensor 1 The SunSensor component combines 12 actual sun sensors.
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4.1. Model Calibration
A simulation model that is built using white box and expert knowledge requires subsequent
calibration to maximize its accuracy. Classically, model calibration is done manually in a trial-and-error
fashion by the systems engineer. Initially, a set of parameters, that are deemed reasonable, are picked
and then iteratively refined until a certain model accuracy in regard to a quality metric has been
reached. The most common metric used is the root-mean-squared error (RMSE). For components with
a large number of parameters, which have non-linear dependencies among each other, the manual
calibration turned out to be a highly work intensive and time consuming task.
To address this issue, only components with few parameters and those whose power consumption
is based on their measurable discrete state were manually calibrated, while more complex and
dynamic components, like the reaction wheels were calibrated by using a Cyclic Genetic Algorithm
(CGA) [29] that was implemented in Java. The CGA consists of two independently working Genetic
Algorithms (GA) [30], hybridized with a hill climber [31]. The CGA starts with a population of sets of
random parameter values and uses the GA operations “selection”, “mutation”, and “recombination”
to iteratively modify those values in order to maximize a so-called fitness function. The two GAs of the
CGA are the GA Calibrator, used to converge the population and the GA Diversifier, used to diversify
the population. The GA Calibrator uses a low mutation rate and a recombination strategy that favors
convergence, while the GA Diversifier uses a high mutation rate and a recombination strategy that
favors diversification. The GA Calibrator and the GA Diversifier have a cyclical relationship, as the GA
Calibrator passes the population to the GA Diversifier, when the solution can no longer be improved
and the GA Diversifier passes the population back to the GA Calibrator after a diversification phase
has been performed. When the CGA is stuck at a local optimum and the GA Calibrator is unable to
improve the solution after a diversification phase has been performed, the hill climber is used to further
refine the solution, before the population is passed to the GA Diversifier. The algorithm terminates,
when a certain number of iterations, so-called generations, has been reached or no improvement was
made for a certain number of generations. The fitness function of the CGA, as well as the quality
metric for the hill climber, was chosen to be the RMSE and for the calibration of the model components,
housekeeping data of the qualification model of the SONATE Nano-satellite and data recorded during
component tests was used. The resulting parameters from the manual and automatic calibration were
used as an initial calibration for the model.
4.2. Data and Interfaces
The telemetry client supplies the fault detection system with telemetry data after the housekeeping
data has been calibrated according to a calibration specification contained in a special database, the
so-called telemetry database. These calibrations include e.g., the conversion of analog-to-digital
converter (ADC) values from the raw housekeeping data to voltage values in volt (V). While the
telemetry client formats the telemetry data according to a format specification contained in the telemetry
database before displaying it, the fault detection system receives the calibrated non-formatted data, as
it uses its own adjustable formats for computation and display of the data. Each housekeeping frame
is used to simulate a single time step. With each time step, all of the components that can be simulated
during this time step, given the current housekeeping data frame, are simulated. The positions of the
different telemetry parameters within the housekeeping frames are fixed and do not change during
operation, e.g., parameter x is always at position y within the housekeeping frame. However, not
all telemetry parameters are always available, e.g., when a component is turned off, its sensors no
longer produce meaningful values. A validity check has to be performed on the different parameter
values, as these invalid parameter values are still contained in the housekeeping frame. For each
parameter, a Boolean condition can be formulated. If this condition holds true, the parameter value
is valid; or else, the value is invalid and can be discarded. In order for the fault detection system
to simulate the model, it has to be supplied with the housekeeping data of the satellite. Therefore,
the different telemetry parameters have to be mapped to ports of the model. No static port mapping
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can be used for the SONATE Nano-satellite, since most of the redundantly available components
share the same parameter positions within the housekeeping frame, due to a strict data size limit of
the housekeeping data, as given by the downlink capacity. To reduce the size of the housekeeping
frame, for most components that are redundantly available, only the telemetry data of the currently
active component is being recorded, e.g., there exist two AROS components, AROS1 and AROS2, of
which only one can be active at a given time. However, the housekeeping frame only contains data
for one AROS system. Therefore, these parameter values need to be conditionally mapped to their
respective model component, e.g., when AROS1 is active, the AROS values from the housekeeping
data frame are mapped to AROS1 and when AROS2 is active they are mapped to AROS2. Each such
condition is a Boolean expression that is being evaluated based on the current housekeeping data
frame. When a condition holds true, an appropriate port mapping is created and the model is supplied
with the respective parameter value. Mappings to inports are being created independent of whether
the respective parameter is available or not, since the model requires values for inports in order for
the outports to be simulatable. The model itself takes care of how the actual inport values are being
processed and it makes sure that no unavailable value is being used to compute an output value.
Mappings to outports of unavailable parameter values are not created, in order to ensure that no limit
check and no comparison between measured and simulated values are done, when the measured
values hold no meaningful information. An outport for which the measured value is not available uses
the simulated output only, for further propagation.
Besides the necessary data to simulate the model, the model’s internal parameters are adjustable
at runtime. Such model parameters include e.g., the internal resistance of the battery and the base
current draw of the different microcontrollers. As a direct change to the quantitative descriptions
would make a recompilation of the model necessary, the model parameters are modelled as inports
instead. The model parameters are then supplied as input values, allowing for a change of the model
parameters at runtime without the need to change the quantitative descriptions themselves, and
therefore eliminating any downtime in regards to recalibration of the model.
5. Experiments
For the following experiments, the housekeeping data of the qualification model of the
SONATE-Nano satellite was used and directly modified to simulate malfunctions of components.
For all experiments, a cut-off factor of 1.0 was used. The housekeeping data was generated by
the qualification model of the SONATE-Nano satellite and transmitted via UHF/VHF Radio to the
receiver of the ground station where it was forwarded to the telemetry client, into which the fault
detection system is integrated. As the voltage and current sensors of the OBDHs were disabled on the
qualification model, these values have been added artificially to the housekeeping data while using
their respective expected values taken from previous component tests. To simulate a malfunction,
the housekeeping data was used as a base and manipulated either directly or by adjusting model
parameters, given to the simulator to generate the response of the system and finally the modified
housekeeping data and the response were merged, which results in a consistent data frame containing
the simulated malfunction. The fault detection system only received data for those ports for which it
would have received the data while using actual unmodified housekeeping data.
5.1. Boost Converter Malfunction
The deterioration of the efficiency of one of the boost converters, Boostconverter2, was simulated
to demonstrate the applicability of the model-based fault detection system. The component
Boostconverter2 draws a larger current from the power supply than expected. This is detected
by a discrepancy at its port CurrentDrawOut (CDO), as depicted in Figure 20, because its tolerance
intervals in the component class definition are exceeded (see Section 3.3.1). This discrepancy must
be caused either by the Boostconverter itself or by its adjacent components (resp. their neighbor
etc.). In this case, Battery2 is an excluded component, since further discrepancies at its other output
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ports would be expected (e.g. at port VBO in Figure 20). The port CurrentOut (CO) of Battery2 is
unsimulatable as it requires measured values from the deactivated solar panels, which are modelled
as sensor components and do not produce simulated values. Therefore, the solar panels have no
effect on the port CurrentOut (CO) of Battery2 and its output has the same value as CurrentDrawIn
(CDI), i.e., the value of CurrentDrawIn is forwarded to CurrentOut. The component Battery2 is an
excluded component, as neither of its measured outport values violates a limit and for each of its
simulatable outports, there exists a measured and a simulated value, which do not diverge from each
other by more than the tolerance intervals defined for the respective port allow. Bus2 cannot cause the
discrepancy either, as the values of its port CurrentOut (CO) are correct and Bus2 does not feature any
other discrepancies, and therefore is not a symptom component (see Section 3.3.2).
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Figure 20. Simplified schematic depiction of the suspected component Boostconverter2 in red together
with its adjacent components (not suspected, therefore in green), taken over from the satellite model
from Figure 19 with relevant ports (boxes within the components with their abbreviated names above
the boxes, e.g., VBO) and relevant port values (values within the port boxes if available, top value:
measured, bottom value: simulated). Forward connections are depicted by solid arrows, backward
connections by dotted lines. Comparisons between measured and simulated values are performed at
the output ports (denoted with an outgoing arrow; if an output value is not available, it is denoted
with “NA”; the port box color denotes red for detected discrepancies, green for correct and white
for unknown). Input ports are white, because they do not compute discrepancies, and use measured
values if available, otherwise simulated values.
As a discrepancy was observed at the port CurrentDrawOut (CDO) of Boostconverter2, a symptom
is generated, with Boostconverter2 being the corresponding symptom component and CurrentDrawOut
being the symptom port. Figure 21 shows the corresponding symptom that was contained in the
diagnosis.xml-file generated by the fault detection system.
There exists one single diagnosis, containing the boost converter for which a fault was induced, as
can be seen in Figure 22. The diagnosis has a score of 1.0, given by a relative pseudo probability, here
simply denoted as probability.
In this experiment, the measured current drawn from the power supply was 0.34 A, while the
expected current was 0.18 A. The difference between the measured and expected values are quite
large, but their absolute values are not large enough to exceed a limit, therefore no anomaly would be
apparent by using the telemetry alone. To detect the fault using the telemetry alone, the operator would
need to have enough expertise to deduce that given X different loads from different other telemetry
pages and the present state of the power supply, the correct current that is being drawn from the power
supply has to be 0.18 A, instead of 0.34 A. It is unlikely that the operator would detect this discrepancy
based on the telemetry in practice, since no limit was violated. Hard limit violations occur close to a
component failure and, before that, the components usually start to behave anomalous with increasing
severity in the deviation from their nominal behavior. Detecting abnormal behavior in time, before a
limit is violated, allows for counter measures to be initiated, which may prevent a system failure.
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Figure 22. The diagnosis corresponding to the malfunction of Boostconverter2. The diagnosis
consists only of Boostconverter2, meaning that a malfunction of Boostconverter2 would explain the
observed discrepancy.
5.2. Transceiver Malfunction
A special anomaly was detected within the unmodified housekeeping data of the qualification
model of the SONATE Nano-satellite. One of the transceivers was turned on, but its power consumption
was measured to be 0 mA, as opposed to an expected value of approximately 16.14 mA. This discrepancy
can be seen at the port CurrentOut (CO) of Transceiver1 in Figure 23. The cause for the discrepancy
is Transceiver1, Boostconverter1, or Bus1. As Boostconverter1 is an excluded component, it cannot
have caused the discrepancy and, while Bus1 is initially suspected by Transceiver1, it gets relieved by
other consumers that were connected to it and is therefore not deemed a possible cause of the observed
discrepancy either.
As the transceiver cannot be turned on, while consuming no power, either the current sensor on the
transceivers circuit board is malfunctioning or the transceiver is turned off, even though it is supposed
to be turned on. The fault detection system identified the transceiver as a symptom component, and the
diagnosis only contained the symptomatic transceiver. The fault detection system could not find any
other discrepancies. The solution to this anomaly turned out to be that the data was generated during
component tests and that the transceivers connection to the satellites power supply was cut off, while
the transceiver was externally supplied with power. Therefore, the transceiver could be turned on, while
drawing 0 mA current from the satellites power supply. The ability of Transceiver1 to be externally
powered was not considered during modelling and it was unexpected when encountered first. This
Aerospace 2019, 6, 105 26 of 34
experiment showed that the fault detection and diagnosis system is able to detect malfunctions that are
caused by arbitrary behavior that deviates from the nominal behavior of a component.
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5.3. OBDH Voltage Converter Malfunction
For the next experiment, a malfunction of the voltage converter OBDH1Conv of OBDH1 was
simulated. Instead of generating a 3.3 V output via its outport VoltageOut (VO), its output is observed
to be 3.12 V, as can be seen in Figure 24. While Bus1 and Bus2 might supply OBDH1Conv, it can only
be supplied by one of them at a given time. A parameter, modeled as input value defines which bus
supplies OBDH1Conv. In this case, OBDH1Conv is supplied by, and draws from, Bus2. The dynamic
port dependencies therefore do not contain the connections to Bus1, causing Bus1 and Boostconverter1
not to be considered. The remaining components that might have caused the observed discrepancy are
OBDH1Conv itself, OBDH1, Bus2, or Boostconverter2. As OBDH1 and Boostconverter2 are excluded
components and other consumers relieve Bus2, OBDH1Conv is the only suspected component.
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The diagnosis system identified OBDH1Conv as symptom component and the diagnosis only
contained ODBH1Conv. Therefore, the malfunction of OBDH1Conv was successfully detected and no
other component was wrongfully suspected to malfunction.
5.4. OBDH Voltage Converter and OBDH Malfunction
Two discrepancies were induced for the next experiment. The voltage converter OBDH1Conv
was manipulated like before and, additionally, the current draw of OBDH1 caused a discrepancy at its
port CurrentOut (CO), as can be seen in Figure 25. Like in the previous experiment OBDH1Conv and
therefore Bus2 supplies OBDH1, therefore Bus1 and Boostconverter1 have no effect on the behavior
of OBDH1Conv and OBDH1. The component Boostconverter2 is an excluded component and Bus2
is relieved by other consumers, causing it to be deemed to be working correctly. In contrast to the
previous experiment, OBDH1 is now suspected to malfunction because of the discrepancy at its port
CurrentOut (CO). Due to the cyclical relation of OBDH1Conv and OBDH1, a malfunction of OBDH1
can explain the discrepancies detected at OBDH1 and OBDH1Conv and a malfunction of OBDH1Conv
can explain the discrepancies that were detected at OBDH1Conv and OBDH1.
Aerospace 2019, 6, x 29 of 36 
 
5.4 OBDH Voltage Converter and OBDH Malfunction 
Two discrepancies were induced for the next experiment. The voltage converter OBDH1Conv 
was manipulated like before and, additionally, the current draw of OBDH1 caused a discrepancy at 
its port CurrentOut (CO), as can be seen in Figure 25. Like in the previous experiment OBDH1Conv 
and therefore Bus2 supplies OBDH1, therefore Bus1 and Boostconverter1 have no effect on the 
behavior of OBDH1Conv and OBDH1. The component Boostconverter2 is an excluded component 
and Bus2 is relieved by other consumers, causing it to be deemed to be working correctly. In contrast 
to the previous experiment, OBDH1 is now suspected to malfunction because of the discrepancy at 
its port CurrentOut (CO). Due to the cyclical relation of OBDH1Conv and OBDH1, a malfunction of 
OBDH1 can explain the discrepancies detected at OBDH1 and OBDH1Conv and a malfunction of 
OBDH1Conv can explain the discrepancies that were detected at OBDH1Conv and OBDH1. 
 
Figure 25. Simplified schematic depiction of the suspected component OBDH1Conv and OBDH1 and 
its relevant surrounding components. In addition to the explanation of Figure 20, OBDH1Conv and 
OBDH1 are depicted in a lighter shade of red to indicate that the probability of their respective 
diagnosis is lower than in the previous experiments. 
Due to the cyclical relationship of the OBDH and its voltage converter, the malfunction of 
OBDH1 might have been induced by a (not necessarily observed) previous fault occurring at 
OBDH1Conv and the malfunction of OBDH1Conv may have been induced by a fault occurring at 
OBDH1. Correctly, OBDH1 is contained in the conflict set of OBDH1Conv and OBDH1Conv is 
contained in the conflict set of OBDH1. 
Figure 26 shows the symptom components that are listed in the diagnosis.xml-file. Both of the 
discrepancies were detected by the fault detection system. The diagnoses that were contained in the 
diagnosis.xml-file can be seen in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 26. The symptom components OBDH1 and OBDH1Conv corresponding to the detected 
discrepancies listed in the diagnosis.xml-file. 
Figure 25. Simplified schematic depiction of the suspected component OBDH1Conv and OBDH1
and its relevant surrounding components. In addition to the explanation of Figure 20, OBDH1Conv
and OBDH1 are depicted in a lighter shade of red to indicate that the probability of their respective
diagnosis is lower than in the previous experiments.
Due to the cyclical relationship of the OBDH and its voltage converter, the malfunction of OBDH1
might have been induced by a (not necessarily observed) previous fault occurring at OBDH1Conv and
the malfunction of OBDH1Conv may have been induced by a fault occurring at OBDH1. Correctly,
OBDH1 is contained in the conflict set of OBDH1Conv and OBDH1Conv is contained in the conflict
set of OBDH1.
Figure 26 shows the symptom components that are listed in the diagnosis.xml-file. Both of the
discrepancies were detected by the fault detection system. The diagnoses that were contained in the
diagnosis.xml-file can be seen in Figure 27.
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5.5. Interface Board Malfunction
For the next experime t, a malfunction of Interfaceboard1 with turned on ADCS1, AROS1,
Reactionhweel1, and Reactionwheel2 components was simulated. The malfunction causes the supply
voltage to abnormally drop at Interfaceboard1, which in turn leads to an increase in the current drawn
by the consumers connected to it. This causes a discrepancy at the port CurrentOut (CO) of AROS1, at
the port CurrentOut (CO) of Reactionhweel1 and at the port CurrentOut (CO) of Reactionhweel2, as
can be seen in Figure 28. As Interfaceboard1 is not directly measured, no discrepancy can be detected
at Interfaceboard1 and no symptom can be generated for it. A malfunction of Interfaceboard1 can
only be detected by observing the deviation of the observed behavior of the connected consumers
from their expected behavior. The consumers that may be affected by a malfunction of Interfaceboard1
are Reactionhweel1, Reactionhweel2, AROS1, and the ASAP payload (not depicted because it is
turned off). However, if abnormal behavior is observed at these components, then a malfunction of
Interfaceboard1 is just one of multiple possible causes. Since all of the components are connected to
the power supply via a bus, a malfunction of the power supply is also a viable candidate. Additionally,
the reaction wheels are controlled by both ADCS systems, ADCS1 and ADCS2 (not depicted because
it is turned off), which makes them a candidate to cause abnormal behaviour that is associated
with the reaction wheels. The simplest explanation for a malfunction of the payloads is that the
payloads themselves are malfunctioning. However, this becomes less likely, the more payloads are
simultaneously malfunctioning. As ASAP is turned off, it has no effect on the remaining system.
Each ADCS system is able to control all of the reaction wheels and therefore has a connection to
each of them, but only one ADCS system is active at a time. as ADCS2 is turned off, the dynamic
port dependencies do not include connections to ADCS2. Therefore, ADCS2 is not considered.
The components Boostconverter1 and ADCS1 are excluded components, since there exist measured and
simulated values for all of their output ports, which do not deviate from each other more than allowed
by their respective tolerance intervals and no measured value violates a threshold limit. The remaining
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components that can cause the observed discrepancies are AROS1, Reactionwheel1, Reactionhweel2,
Interfaceboard1, and Bus1. Bus1 is relieved by other consumers, including ADCS1 via the ADCS1Conv
component (not depicted due to readability reasons) and deemed to be not suspicious. Interfaceboard1
is relieved by Boostconverter1, but, as it is suspected by all symptom components, Interfaceboard1 is
found to be malfunctioning.Aerospace 2019, 6, x 31 of 36 
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diagnosis is a simultaneous malfunction of AROS1, Reactionwheel1, and Reactionwheel2. The first 
diagnosis has a significantly higher pseudo probability. It is more likely for Interfaceboard1 to 
malfunction and cause all symptoms, then for AROS1, Reactionhweel1, and Reactionwheel2 to 
malfunction simultaneously and cause the symptoms associated with each of them independently. 
The second diagnosis however is not impossible either, since no definitive statement about the state 
of Interfaceboard1 can be made, as it is not directly measurable. The second diagnosis could have 
been omitted by using an appropriate cut-off factor. As the anomalous behaving components are 
connected to Bus1, the components that are connected to Bus2 are unaffected. The fault detection 
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Figure 28. Simplified schematic depiction of the suspected components AROS1, Reactionwheel1,
Reactionwheel2, and Interfaceboard1 and its relevant surrounding components (explanation see
Figure 20). The dark red coloring of Interfaceboard1 indicates that it is part of a diagnosis with a high
probability and the light red coloring of AROS1, Reactionwheel1, and Reactionwheel2 indicates that
they are part of a diagnosis with a lower probability.
A look into the diagnosis.xml-file gives more information about the observed discrepancies.
Figure 29 shows the symptom components, corresponding to the detected discrepancies, as listed
in the diagnosis.xml-file. The symptom components are AROS1, Reactionwheel1, and Reactionwheel2.
Even though the malfunction was induced for Interfaceboard1, it is not a symptom component, as
neither of its outputs can be measured, and therefore no abnormal behavior can be directly observed
at Interfaceboard1.
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Figure 29. Th y pto o ponents R S1, Reactionh eel1, and Reactionh eel2 corresponding to
the detected discrepancies listed in the diagnosis.xml-file.
Figure 30 shows the diagnose that were computed by the fault detection system. In this case there
exist two diagn ses. The first diagnosis s a malfunction o I terfaceboard1 and the second diagnosis is
a simultaneous malfuncti n of AROS1, Reactionwheel1, and Reactionwheel2. The first diagnosis has a
significantly higher pseudo probability. It is more likely for Interfaceboard1 to malfunction and cause
all symptoms, then for AROS1, Reactionhweel1, and Reactionwheel2 to malfu ction simultan ously
and cause the symptoms a sociated with each of the independ ntly. The sec nd diag osis however
is not impossible either, sinc no definit ve statem nt about the state o I terfaceboard1 c n be made, s
it is ot dir ctly measurable. Th second diagnosis could have e n omitted by using an appropri te
cut-off fac or. As the anomalous beh ving c mponents are con ected to Bus1, the components that
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are connected to Bus2 are unaffected. The fault detection system detected the abnormal behavior
of AROS1, Reactionwheel1, and Reactionwheel2, identified the possible causes and focused on the
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5.6. Summary of Results
The experiments showed that the fault detection system was able to identify the induced
malfunctions and find the root causes. Three single faults, a cyclical fault, and a fault that can only be
indirectly observed were considered and diagnosed. The single faults of Boostconverter2 (Section 5.1)
and OBDH1Conv (Section 5.3) were successfully identified and correctly diagnosed. The unexpected
behavior of Transceiver1 was successfully identified even though Transceiver1 was not considered to
be powered externally during modelling (Section 5.2). The cyclical relationship of the components
OBDH1Conv and OBDH1, for which discrepancies were detected, was successfully captured and
diagnosed (Section 5.4). In the case of the not directly observable malfunction of Interfaceboard1,
all of the discrepancies were detected and Interfaceboard1 was correctly found to be malfunctioning
with a very high diagnosis probability. Components that were not involved in the malfunctions were
identified and no unrelated component was wrongfully suspected to malfunction. As no threshold
limit violations occurred during any of the experiments, the detected discrepancies in the experiments
could not have been detected by an operator while using telemetry alone. Table 2 summarizes the
different experiments performed and their results.
Table 2. Summary of the different experiments performed and their results
Ex. MalfunctioningComponents
Detected
Discrepancies
Identified Diagnoses
(Probability) Result
1 Boostconverter2 CDO atBoostconverter2 Boostconverter2 (100%)
Cause of discrepancy
correctly diagnosed.
2 Transceiver1 CO at Transceiver1 Transceiver1 (100%) Cause of discrepancycorrectly diagnosed.
3 OBDH1Conv VO at OBDH1Conv OBDH1Conv (100%) Cause of discrepancycorrectly diagnosed.
4 OBDH1Conv VO at OBDH1Conv,CO at OBDH1
OBDH1Conv (50%)/OBDH1
(50%)
Both discrepancies detected.
Cyclical relationship
identified and most viable
diagnoses computed.
5 Interfaceboard1
CO at AROS1, CO
at Reactionwheel1,
CO at
Reactionwheel2
Interfaceboard1 (93%)/AROS1,
Reactionwheel1,
Reactionwheel2 (7%)
Discrepancies caused by not
directly observable
malfunction detected. Root
cause determined and
plausible probabilities
assigned to d gnoses.
Aerospace 2019, 6, 105 31 of 34
6. Discussion
The experiments showed that the model-based fault detection system allows for the detection
of abnormal behavior, which cannot always be detected using the telemetry data alone. The most
interesting types of malfunctions are those that do not cause a complete component failure immediately.
These types of malfunctions usually occur prior to a component failure and they should therefore
be detected early on, in order to be able to initiate countermeasures in time. These slight deviations
however are difficult to capture using a classical approach and often go unnoticed. With the help of
the model-based fault detection system, such deviations can be found while using a model of only
the nominal behavior of the spacecraft. To reduce the time from the occurrence of a malfunction to
the time the first countermeasure is initiated, the fault-detection system uses a diagnosis component,
which narrows down the possible causes of the detected anomalies. These diagnoses help the operator
to focus his or her attention on the components that are most likely to malfunction. Additionally,
a graphical user interface displays the model graph and visually notifies the operator when an anomaly
has been detected. The fault-detection system itself works autonomously, even when no operator
is present and it needs no active maintenance. Due to the strict separation of the model from the
diagnostic algorithm, the diagnostic capabilities of a spacecraft can be adapted and expanded, simply
by adjusting the model. Changes of model parameters, e.g., due to recalibration, can be performed
without additional downtime of the fault detection and diagnosis system. Additionally, the system
can easily be transferred from one spacecraft to another, since only the model needs to be changed,
while the diagnostic algorithm requires no re-engineering. The main drawback of the model-based
approach is the dependency on a sufficiently accurate system model. While white box and expert
knowledge may be obtained fairly easily, the model calibration is still a tedious and time consuming
task. Components whose behavior is of highly dynamic nature need special attention, since they
require the most amounts of data and time for calibration. The authors of this paper recommend the
use of a global optimization algorithm to either calibrate those components automatically, or to produce
good initial parameter values for a consequent manual calibration. To ensure that a model is sufficiently
accurate and correctly calibrated, a goodness of fit metric, like the root-mean-squared error (RMSE),
should be used on recoded data, prior to putting the model into operation. Using a model that does
not capture the systems nominal behavior sufficiently accurately or a model that is not well calibrated
might cause the fault-detection system to produce either false-positives, false-negatives, or both. In the
case of false-positives the operator will have to filter out wrongly detected malfunctions, while in
the case of false-negatives, actual malfunctions are not detected. Besides the initial calibration, wear
and degradation might affect the components of the spacecraft. Natural degradation is not always an
indicator of a malfunction and should therefore be accounted for by recalibration. Natural degradation
mainly affects mechanical parts, but also components, like batteries, with the most common form of
degradation being a reduced battery capacity after a large number of charge-discharge cycles. Another
factor that affects the quality of the fault-detection is the accuracy of the sensors used within the
spacecraft. A recorded sudden current spike for example could be interpreted as an anomaly and cause
a false-positive. Inaccurate sensors cause the need for larger tolerance intervals, which in turn decreases
the sensitivity of the model and therefore might increase the amount of false-negatives. For an optimal
operation of the fault-detection system, the sensors should be as accurate as possible and the data
collection well timed, so that the delay between the times of measurement of the different parameter
values supplied to the fault-detection system at one time step is minimal. The fault-detection system
should be automatically supplied with the spacecraft’s housekeeping data. To enable continuous
operation of the fault-detection system, it should have direct access to the housekeeping data without
the interaction of an operator needed.
7. Conclusions
We have presented a quantitative model-based fault detection and diagnosis system that strictly
separates the model from the diagnosis algorithm and demonstrated its applicability by using a model
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of the power supply of the qualification model of the SONATE-Nano satellite. We have done so,
by modifying actual housekeeping data of the qualification model of the SONATE-Nano satellite to
simulate malfunctions, which then were diagnosed by the fault detection system. We have illustrated
that the malfunctions were difficult to spot while using the telemetry alone, while the fault detection
system was able to easily identify the malfunctioning components. Future work will include the
adaption of the fault detection system to the flight model of the SONATE-Nano satellite and the
successive porting of the fault detection system to be uploaded and run on board the SONATE-Nano
satellite, which was launched July 5th 2019, shortly before the end of the ADIA-L project, during which
the fault detection system that is presented in this paper was developed. The fault detection system is
supposed to work autonomously on board and transmit the detected malfunctions as telemetry to a
ground station during contact times. First, the simulator and the symptom calculation will be ported
and then, later, the conflict and hitting set computation. Long-term development includes the tackling
of transient phenomena, e.g., current spikes, adaptive tolerance intervals using machine learning
techniques, the implementation of a rule-based component to directly initiate counter measures when
a malfunction is detected, an increased incorporation of heuristic knowledge, and a closed loop of
periodic automatic recalibration of the systems model during operation.
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